The Rise and Fall of a Transactional Army

How the U.S. Department of Defense is Pulling Pages from the Wagner Playbook.

Another Live Drop Commentary

by Mark Valley

This piece began as a reflection on an interview I recorded for The Live Drop, my podcast about intelligence, espionage and national security. In Episode 72, I sat down with journalist and author John Lechner to discuss his book Death Is Our Business, a riveting investigation into the Wagner Group. As we rambled through the rise and fall of Yevgeny Prigozhin and Wagner’s globe-trotting exploits—from Ukraine to Syria to Africa and back to Ukraine—it occurred to me that Wagner's model wasn’t just a Russian phenomenon. It was starting to feel familiar.

The conversation kept returning to one idea: What happens when a national military begins to act like a business? What are the trade-offs when force becomes a commodity? These questions, once reserved for mercenary outfits like Wagner, Triple Canopy, Blackwater (now known as something forgettable) are now increasingly relevant to the United States military under the leadership of Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth.

The Wagner Playbook: Origins, Expansion, and Adaptation

Wagner’s origins are murky but traceable to the early days of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine in 2014, where it operated as a semi-deniable instrument of Russian power. Its founder, Dmitry Utkin—an ex-GRU officer with a fondness for Nazi regalia—named the group after his favorite composer. The funding came from Yevgeny Prigozhin, a former purse snatcher and hot dog vendor turned Kremlin caterer who evolved into Russia’s most visible private warlord.

In Syria, Wagner rapidly escalated from support roles to direct combat and resource extraction. One infamous incident involved Wagner operatives racing across the desert to seize control of a natural gas processing plant. This facility, while holding little strategic value for the Assad regime, offered Wagner a lucrative asset. The move was symbolic of their approach: capture infrastructure that could fund their presence, not advance a national objective. They were not fighting for ideology, but for invoices.

In Africa, Wagner’s strategy matured. In the Central African Republic, they embedded themselves deeply into local politics. Wagner-trained security forces guarded key officials while Russian mining companies—such as Lobaye Invest and M-Invest—extracted valuable gold, diamonds, and other minerals. In effect, Wagner became a diplomatic extension of the Russian state: offering peace and protection in return for mining concessions. Their soldiers became brokers, bodyguards, and enforcers of commercial treaties.

Wagner at War: Ukraine’s Frontlines and the Jailhouse Recruits

As Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine unfolded, Wagner shifted into a new role: shock troops. Facing mounting losses and stretched military resources, the Kremlin allowed Wagner to recruit directly from prisons. Inmates were offered pardons in exchange for six months on the front lines. These convicts—poorly trained but highly expendable—were assigned the most dangerous missions.

Unlike their African deployments, Wagner in Ukraine couldn’t profit as much off the land and resources. There were no mining concessions, no private contracts. Their funding and supplies were entirely dependent on the Kremlin. When resources fell short, so did loyalty. In 2023, Wagner revolted. Prigozhin’s forces marched toward Moscow in a short-lived mutiny that revealed just how brittle the relationship was between a mercenary force and its state sponsor.

U.S. Military's Shift Toward Transactional Engagements

Under Secretary Hegseth, the U.S. Department of Defense has signaled a move toward a more transactional military posture. During a recent diplomatic visit to the Philippines, Hegseth emphasized that U.S. military support—including joint exercises and weapons deployment—would be contingent upon financial contributions.

In private Signal chats, figures like Senator JD Vance and advisor Stephen Miller discussed U.S. missile strikes on Houthi rebels as if they were pay-to-play actions. Before providing further military support to European partners, they reportedly insisted on remuneration. This is not the language of strategic alliance. It’s the language of transactional warfare.

In another glaring example, Trump and his conflict negotiators are openly discussing securing mineral rights from Ukraine in exchange for U.S. weapons or more favorable results from a Trump-Putin agreement. The idea that critical minerals and military protection could be swapped like commodities suggests a shift in values—from allied mutual defense to leveraged deals.

Compounding these changes, Hegseth has also taken aim at the military’s legal and ethical oversight. He recently dismissed a panel of Inspectors General—military legal officers responsible for reviewing the use of force, rules of engagement, and battlefield conduct. His stated reason? To create a "more lethal" force, free from what he views as bureaucratic constraints. Critics argue this move undermines core legal standards and erodes accountability in wartime operations. By sidelining military judges and lawyers, Hegseth is stripping away a critical layer of ethical oversight that distinguishes democratic armed forces from autocratic or mercenary ones.

Advantages of a Transactional Army

To be fair, a transactional military model has its appeal. It offers a clear quid pro quo that may reduce endless entanglements by placing a price on intervention. It could also deter free-riding by allied nations and provide a financial offset to America’s vast military expenditures. In theory, a pay-to-play model makes defense more efficient and cost-conscious.

It might even appeal to war-weary voters. Why should America fund European security, the logic goes, if Europe won’t pay for its own defense? Why strike the Houthis and risk a spike in global oil prices unless someone foots the bill?

But these questions miss the larger point: U.S. military power has never simply been a tool for cash reimbursement. It has been a force to uphold a favorable strategic balance. Enforce global norms, project values, and protect a fragile international order.

Comparative Elements Between Wagner and U.S. Military Strategies

1. Resource-Driven Engagements: Both Wagner and the U.S. under Trump and Hegseth demonstrate a focus on leveraging military operations for economic or strategic gain. Wagner seized mines and gas fields; Trump seeks mineral rights from Ukraine.

2. Conditional Military Support: Wagner offers protection in return for payment. Hegseth and Trump allies have adopted a similar posture—aid is now transactional. No payment, no protection. Whether in the Philippines, in Ukraine, or against the Houthis, the U.S. military is no longer treated as a global stabilizer but as an armed invoice.

3. Privatization and Loyalty Shifts: Wagner was a private army loyal to Prigozhin and, loosely, to the Kremlin’s strategic goals. The danger now is not that America will outsource its army, but that the U.S. military will become so politicized and financially leveraged that its loyalty shifts—from the Constitution to a leader. As mentioned, under Hegseth, there is movement to remove military judges and limit oversight of battlefield conduct in favor of "lethality."

Putin's Position Post-Wagner

With the fiery demise of Prigozhin and the fragmentation of Wagner, there’s growing speculation over whether Vladimir Putin is seeking to replicate the Wagner model or has reverted to full reliance on national forces. The Russian law against mercenary armies was never about protecting human rights. It was always about control. When Wagner grew too powerful and publicly challenged the Kremlin, it was dismantled.

Putin is now leaning more on state forces and has reabsorbed Wagner remnants under stricter military command. But the utility of the mercenary model is not lost on him. Should another foreign adventure require plausible deniability or off-the-books brutality, another Wagner-style force will likely emerge—with different branding, but the same DNA.

Potential Implications of a Transactional Military Approach

Adopting a mercenary-like model poses several risks:

· Erosion of Alliances: Traditional alliances based on mutual values and trust may weaken if military support becomes contingent on financial transactions.

· Compromised Ethical Standards: A profit-driven military might prioritize financial gain over adherence to international laws and ethical conduct, potentially leading to human rights violations akin to those associated with Wagner’s operations.

· Internal Cohesion Challenges: Shifting the military’s focus from serving national interests to transactional engagements could undermine morale and cohesion within the armed forces, as service members grapple with altered motivations and loyalties.

Conclusion

While the Wagner Group’s model has proven effective in expanding Russia’s influence through economically motivated military engagements, replicating such a strategy within the U.S. military framework raises significant concerns. The foundational principles of the U.S. armed forces—centered on duty to the Constitution and ethical conduct—may be at risk if a transactional approach supersedes traditional values and alliances.

For a mercenary army to close with and kill the enemy—they don't even need an enemy, nor do they need to be participating in a war that is morally justified. This is one load the military enterprise does not have to bear. They don't need a national grievance. They don't need a hero’s story. A is paid to kill B—and that is all there is to it.

In the dawn of the transactional army, will American soldiers agree to fight Panama? Canada? Greenland? Will colonial landgrabs for natural resources become fashionable again? That seems like a 150-year-old idea, revived with modern tech, modern spin, and the same old propaganda to hide the rapacious entitlement of unprovoked aggression.

The U.S. military isn’t supposed to be a rent-a-force. Yet under the current trajectory, that distinction is becoming less clear. When high-level policy discussions shift to encrypted Signal chats with disappearing messages, and oversight panels are purged in favor of unrestrained "lethality," transparency gives way to opacity. Mercenary enterprises are attractive to autocrats precisely because they operate in the shadows—beyond parliamentary scrutiny, media coverage, or democratic debate. That’s the model we are inching toward.

History has seen this before. Rome’s Praetorian Guard, Saddam Hussein’s Republican Guard, Hitler’s Waffen-SS, and Gaddafi’s Revolutionary Guard were all elite forces loyal not to a constitution but to a single ruler. They didn’t protect a nation—they enforced a regime.

The question is not whether democracies can survive a mercenary army. The question is what kind of democracy emerges when loyalty, law, and legitimacy are subordinated to profit, power, and personal allegiance.

It’s not just a change in strategy. It’s a change in character. And character, in the end, is what determines whether a nation defends its principles—or sells them off, one contract at a time.